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British corporate networks, 1976-
2010: extending the study of finance-
industry relationships.   
Using an extensive and unique dataset that has been created to record the composition of the 
boards of directors of the Top 250 British firms between 1904 and 2010, this article builds 
upon a previous study on the corporate network to 1976 by extending the study to 2010.  The 
analysis revolves around three key observations: the nature and depth of the corporate 
network; the distinct stages in corporate connectivity between 1976 and 2010, and the 1980s 
watershed in the relationship between financial and other sectors, following which financial 
institutions withdrew from the corporate network. The article will conclude with an analysis 
of how the dataset has changed our perceptions of British corporate networks, wider changes 
in British business and a discussion of implications for future research.  
 
Introduction 
 
While an extensive literature analysing the relationship between British financial 
institutions and the rest of British business has been generated, it is apparent from a detailed 
and long-term investigation of the corporate network that aspects relating to inter-
organisational relationships and wider patterns associated with the financialisation of British 
business need to be further examined. While the authors recently revisited patterns of 
corporate connectivity in Britain from the beginning of the twentieth century to 1976,1 given 
the continuing shifts in British business and the dramatic changes experienced in the financial 
sector, patterns of corporate connectivity beyond the 1970s are illuminating. The motivation 
behind this article is to extend the study to 2010 in order to gain further insights into patterns 
of corporate connectivity, thereby revealing previously unrecorded changes in British 
corporate networks. Scott and Griff, who conducted a study of the British corporate network 
up to the 1980s concluded that British business was dominated by financial interests,2 given 
both the latter’s extensive representation on boards of directors and recent changes in 
ownership structures. More recently, Froud et. al. substantiate this overarching claim, noting 
that British corporate strategy has come to be dominated by “financialization”, namely, the 
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primacy of maximising shareholder value in order to limit the risk of exit by the financial 
institutions that have come to own the bulk of the equity in British business.3 Of course, 
dramatic shifts in British business are nothing new, in that Hannah’s seminal work highlights 
cycles of corporate activity which transformed the British business landscape over the course 
of the twentieth century.4 Nevertheless, the work of Hannah, Toms, Wilson and Wright, and 
most recently our own, pinpoint a distinct gap in our understanding of the British business 
landscape from a wider perspective.5  
Examining macro-trends in inter-organisational relationships across industries and 
decades allows one to identify specific patterns related to corporate connectivity, 
financialisation, corporate governance and, importantly, shifting patterns of ownership.  As 
Cheffins has recently noted with regard to US business, there is an urgent need to reassess the 
corporate landscape of the twentieth century and reemphasise the passive owner role 
undertaken by large financial institutions, an exercise that must also be conducted on UK 
business in the last century.6 Using a novel methodological tool, the corporate network of 
interlocking directors, this article covers these issues, providing key insights into inter-
organizational relationships, particularly those between financial institutions and industrial 
companies, and assessing the role of a vast range of financial players in British business. 
Illuminating distinct patterns within British corporate connectivity and the position of 
financial institutions in the network as a whole offers a unique perspective into the impact of 
continually changing policies and codes of practice, increasing investment from abroad and 
switches in the role of financial institutions in British business. Alongside examining the 
position of commercial banks in the network, we also give deserved attention to the position 
and connectivity of other financial institutions, such as insurance companies, merchant banks, 
trusts and similar players. This wider perspective reveals numerous pathways for further 
research which could have significant implications for assessing the effectiveness of the 
British regulatory environment, inter-organisational responses to crisis and the impact of 
increasing global financial connectivity. 
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In generating fresh insights into the dynamics at play within British business, an 
extensive and unique dataset has been created to record the composition of the boards of 
directors of the Top 250 British firms (according to net assets) between 1976 and 2010. We 
have chosen to begin our examination in 1976, a post-crisis period which ushered in a new 
era, signifying a distinct change in the nature of Britain’s financial system and corporate 
activity in general.7 Additionally, although inter-war industry reports focused on the role of 
banks in British industry, by the 1970s financial institutions other than commercial banks 
(such as insurance companies, pension and investment funds, merchant banks, etc.) played a 
much greater role in industry. Our focus will be on these financial institutions and their 
position in the corporate network, demonstrating the extent to which boards were connected 
at different points over the last half century.8 
The analysis provides the basis for three key observations that offer a fresh view of 
the relationship between the boards of Britain’s major corporations. Firstly, we observe from 
our data a general move across British business from a well-integrated, dense corporate 
network to one which is far more dispersed. This is consistent with existing empirical 
evidence which associates this dispersion with a lack of shareholder engagement in the 
management of their portfolio companies, a trend that remains unchanged when international 
investors became the dominant owners of UK equities (see Figure 2).9 Secondly, the data 
reveals three distinct stages in corporate connectivity between 1976 and 2010 (pre-Cadbury, 
post-Cadbury, and post-2008 crisis). These stages are accompanied by significant shifts in the 
patterns of ownership of major British business, changing regulations that governed board 
activity, and the growing complexity of transactions which resulted from an influx of a 
plethora financial intermediaries. Thirdly, one can identify a watershed in the relationship 
between the financial and industrial sectors in the 1980s, at which point financial institutions 
started to withdraw from the UK corporate network as a result of the pursuit of global 
strategies and a preference for highly speculative short-term financial trading.10 
4 
 
Starting with a brief synopsis of the various literatures analysing these trends, our 
paper will move on to explain the methods and data employed in pursuing this research 
project, focusing our attention primarily on the depth and nature of the intercorporate 
networks that existed from the 1970s into the early twenty-first century. This will provide the 
basis for an original analysis of the relationship between and within sectors, contributing 
extensively to important debates on financialisation, the evolution of corporate governance 
and cycles of corporate connectivity in Britain over this fifty-year period.11 The article will 
conclude with an analysis of how the dataset has changed our perceptions of British corporate 
networks, feeding directly into policy debates and recent work by the Bank of England on the 
interconnectedness of British financial institutions.12  
 
 Literature Review: The Financial Sector and Corporate Activity in 
Britain 
 
Business historians have a long tradition of examining Britain’s financial sector, 
especially as it pertains to commercial banks over the twentieth century. Particular interest 
has been bestowed upon banking concentration in the early twentieth century and banks in the 
inter-war period, mainly as a result of government and public scrutiny of these institutions at 
that time.13 Works by Cottrell, Billings, Capie, Collins and Ross have served to provide a 
thorough and multi-dimensional examination of banking in Britain, particularly between the 
First and Second World Wars.14 Literature on financial institutions in the post-war period has 
also expanded in recent decades, especially in the context of the turbulent times of the 1970s, 
the deregulation of the 1980s and more recent financial sector complexities and crises,15 
placing much greater emphasis on examining financial institutions within the wider contexts 
of industrial sectors and inter-sector relationships.16 Garnett, Mollan and Bentley demonstrate 
the illuminating patterns that can be deciphered from examining relationships between banks 
over long periods, designating them a ‘system of discreet, interacting agents’.17 Similarly, in 
their investigation of private equity in the UK, Toms and Wright stress the importance of 
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examining inter-organisational relationships (both inter- and intra-sectorally) through 
comparative periodisations, thereby drawing broader conclusions regarding corporate activity 
in the private equity sector.18 Turner also takes this long-run view of understanding banking 
and crises as cyclical and inter-related,19 while our own research on corporate networks from 
1904-1976, as well as this study of the later period, contribute to these long-run examinations 
by highlighting significant trends in British corporate connectivity over a century.20    
The literature on the evolution of corporate governance and the role of financial 
institutions as monitors, advisors and, indeed, owners of British business, has also increased 
in the last twenty years. Bowden’s work on the crisis at Rolls-Royce identifies the importance 
of intra-sectoral ties in finance in assisting critical corporations.21 Similarly, Toms and Wright 
examine the importance of syndicates in domestic industry and the market for corporate 
control.22 Scholars such as Cheffins and Nordberg and McNulty have provided detailed 
longitudinal assessments of changing perceptions of corporate governance, as well as 
definitions and behaviour related to the monitoring of corporate activity.23 While this 
literature is of relatively recent vintage, the debate over the scale and nature of financial 
institutions’ involvement in British industry has persisted throughout the twentieth century. 
This was especially the case in the inter-war years,24 while by the 1950s such had been the 
change in ownership of most firms quoted on the London Stock Exchange (see Figure 2) that 
policy-makers were focusing on the nature of this relationship.25 Although recent significant 
studies by Acheson et al has served to highlight the existence of an “extreme divorce” in the 
relationship between ownership and control even before 1914,26 the post-war period 
witnessed the continuation of this process, albeit with the increasing dominance of first 
institutional investors and after the 1990s, foreign investors.   
One significant factor which has shaped not only the corporate network but also the 
general nature of British business in recent decades is the continual shifting patterns of 
ownership of British firms.  It is apparent that over the twentieth century the nature of 
institutional ownership in particular changed from dispersed and passive to re-concentrated, 
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yet still passive. In separate articles, Davis and Jackson have claimed that a lengthening of the 
investment chain and increasing number of financial intermediaries involved in corporate 
ownership marked a transition from “Managerial Capitalism” to an era of “New Financial 
Capitalism”, namely, a system characterised by a re-concentration of corporate ownership in 
the hands of large investment fund managers, the bulk of whose activity was based on the 
pursuit of short-term investment strategies.27 By the early twenty-first century, UK 
institutional investors’ portfolio turnover had reached 56%,28 while the average holding 
periods of shares has fallen from six years in the 1960s to less than six months by 2015.29 
Another body of research points to the dominance of short-term investors whose impatience 
often erodes value,30 precipitating the expression of deep public concerns about this pattern of 
behaviour. It would nevertheless appear fair to conclude that in spite of these concerns, 
attitudes within the financial sector appear to have changed very little over the last century,31 
in spite of criticisms that short-termism in the UK has had a deleterious impact on corporate 
performance.32 Crucially, there is extensive empirical evidence of investor disengagement, 
inefficient monitoring and lack of influence over corporate management.33 Indeed, such is the 
near universal disengagement of institutional fund managers that in the early twenty-first 
century senior management would appear to be as free to determine corporate strategy as in 
the 1930s, the decade described by Hannah as “the golden age of directorial power”.34  
In recent years, while a large percentage of UK ownership has been transferred into 
the hands of foreign investors, this has increased the distance between the board and 
shareholders, allowing for shareholder passivity to continue.35 Figure 1 demonstrates how the 
proportion of shares traded on the London Stock Exchange held by private investors fell 
dramatically from the early-1960s, reaching just eleven per cent by 2012, while over the same 
period institutional investors such as mutual funds, insurance companies and pension funds 
came to dominate. Although one can explain this trend by noting that individuals increasingly 
preferred to invest their wealth through institutions, as we shall go on to explain the nature of 
institutional ownership portrayed the same passive characteristics as the private investors of 
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the nineteenth century portrayed by Acheson et al.36 The growth in foreign ownership of UK 
listed equities (‘Rest of World’ in Figure 1) remains primarily institutional in nature, 
including sovereign wealth funds and performance-driven hedge funds.37 This reaffirms the 
view that institutional investors have owned the bulk of quoted British equities over the last 
fifty years, leading to a broad acceptance within academic and policy debates that this shift in 
institutional ownership has been allegedly accompanied by a movement away from power 
being vested in corporate boards and senior management to institutional fund managers.38 
These crucial changes in corporate activity, ownership and governance in the last fifty years 
have had significant implications for the network of interlocking directorates and have served 
to shape the network in interesting ways, as will be discussed below.   
Figure 1: Beneficial Ownership of UK equities, 1963-2010 
 
Source: Share register survey report, Central Statistics Office (CSO), 2010. 
Corporate law assigns ultimate decision-making authority to a group (i.e. the Board 
of Directors) rather than a single individual. The board ultimately has three key functions: 
management, oversight and service. The lines between these functions are fuzzy at best and 
over time there has been a shift from boards having an advisory role in the 1970s to a more 
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managerial role in the 1990s, with an increasing emphasis on the monitoring role and director 
independence in the context of persisting corporate scandals and failures in 2000s.39 Given 
these shifts, the board interlock becomes a crucial unit of analysis for wider trends in 
corporate connectivity, providing us with a novel perspective on trends in British business. 
Interlocks comprised of directors who sit on more than one corporate board constitute a 
corporate network, providing incisive insights into the nature of inter-organisational 
relationships. Interlocks often indicate the presence of a commercial relationship, whether 
personal or capital in nature, the latter being a relationship typically between shareholders and 
the company in which they invest.40  Similarly, interlocking directorates have been widely 
analysed in the context of corporate strategy, focusing specifically on the impact of outside 
directors on senior management.41  
The importance of analysing board interlocks is rooted in both the role of the board as 
decision-maker and the various roles of directors who linked multiple boards together (known 
as “linkers”). As a ‘distinctive feature of the corporate form’, boards and links between 
boards offer an insightful representation of company-to-company relationships and wider 
corporate structures.42 As the board has numerous functions which include dictating corporate 
strategy and monitoring the performance and general decision-making of management,43 this 
highlights the significance of studying board inter-locks formed by these so-called “linkers”. 
Previous studies and reports have shown that interlocking directors within their varying 
positions (non-executive, independent, chairman, etc.) can have an impact on corporate 
accountability, decision-making and access to resources (in particular information and 
external contacts).44  
Related to this, our most recent article highlights the presence of what we have 
referred to as ‘big-linkers’ in the first three quarters of the twentieth century. These were 
individuals, usually regarded as having a high social status, who possessed multiple board 
seats; the highest number being seven board seats in 1938 held by two individuals, Lord 
Essendon and J. B. A. Kessler. For the period under investigation in this article, one can 
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observe in Figure 2 the distinct reduction in positions where over five board seats are held by 
one person. While an increase in the presence of those holding four board seats is apparent in 
the late 1990s, by 2010 this number was also significantly reduced.     
Figure 2. Number of board seats held by ‘big linkers’, 1976-2010 
 
 
In cases where outside directors represent shareholders’ interests, Roberts et al. 
argued that these individuals should be motivated to take up non-executive board positions, 
because in doing so this would give them direct access to corporate strategy and allow for 
efficient monitoring of corporate behaviour, as well as opening a useful line of 
communication between owners and top management.45 Given the findings of Acheson et al. 
regarding the lack of shareholder voting rights in early UK companies, it is possible that 
board interlocks (whether as non-executives or other forms of “linkers”) historically acted as 
an alternative conduit to corporate control and continue to do so in the current business 
landscape.46 At the same time, our examination of the corporate network demonstrates not 
only the transformation of corporate connectivity over numerous decades, but also the 
changing composition of board interlocks, potentially isolating boards from contacts which 
could prove useful, thereby impacting on lines of communication throughout British business. 
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Crucially, arising from the analysis of the corporate network data and supplementary data, it 
is clear that the role of financial institutions in the British corporate landscape has shifted 
significantly and the network overall has experienced notable fluctuations in connectivity in 
response to various market conditions and regulatory changes. This is demonstrated by the 
decreasing connectivity of the corporate network, as we shall demonstrate below, especially 
in the case of financial institutions, which have been withdrawing from the core of the UK 
corporate network in recent decades. Additionally, following major corporate governance 
code changes and financial crises, there have also been periods of reactionary network 
reintegration.47  
Examining the corporate network of interlocking directorates as a whole can thus 
provide a unique perspective on the presence of these relationships across and within all 
sectors. Many scholars have adopted this approach for earlier decades. For example, Utton 
highlights the relationship between clearing banks and the manufacturing sector in the mid-
1970s, while Whitely demonstrates the significance of intra-sectoral ties within the financial 
sector in the same period.48  Moreover, while Cosh and Hughes argued in the 1980s that “this 
recurring intimacy between relatively small numbers of giant financial and industrial 
concerns is clearly a significant feature of the contemporary anatomy of corporate control and 
must be taken into account in assessing trends in the separation of ownership and control and 
its behavioural implications”,49 it is clear that investor disengagement is a much more 
common feature of British business, justifying a detailed analysis of how the corporate 
network changed over time.  
Given investor disengagement and short-termism, one must question whether these 
types of relationships were ever of significance in determining corporate strategy.50 Aguilera 
argues that the historical relationship between shareholders and boards of directors has largely 
been ignored due to the passive role of institutional shareholders towards corporate decision-
making.51 In the 1970s, Briston and Dobbins predicted that continued investment by financial 
institutions in industry would draw fund managers much more into managerial problems, thus 
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creating a necessity for investor activism.52 Scott and Griff  have also shown that in the 1970s 
and 1980s the corporate network was comprised of multiple ‘groupings’ of financial and non-
financial enterprises, leading them to conclude that the former were by far the most dominant 
influence on corporate strategy.53 Indeed, they claim that “Financial Capitalism” was the 
abiding characteristic of British business by that decade, given the recent transfer of 
ownership to institutional investors (see Figure 1) and an extensive network of interlocking 
directorates that apparently vested them with paramount control over the rest of British 
business.  
  Although the studies by Scott and Griff and others have provided valuable insights 
into corporate network structures, the role of traditional financial institutions and the 
ownership of equity stakes up to the 1980s, it is now timely to readdress the past fifty years of 
corporate and financial developments. Building on the general approaches suggested by Toms 
et al. and Garnett et al., this article provides a wider lens through which to view the evolution 
of corporate connectivity and activity in the UK from the late 1950s. Through the use of 
corporate network analysis, we can begin to draw important correlations between corporate 
connectivity, integration, dispersion and reintegration of the network, and what this might 
suggest regarding patterns of ownership, shifting corporate strategies and the role of various 
financial players in British business.   
Methodology and Dataset 
A highly effective method of assessing financial-industrial sector relationships has 
been through the use of corporate network analysis. A number of studies reveal the efficacy 
of corporate networks in isolating distinct inter-organisational patterns in business 
communities across the globe. While many of these tend to focus on the US, the Netherlands 
and Germany, scholars such as Scott and Windolf have engaged with aspects of the British 
corporate network.54 This study of the British corporate network significantly adds to the 
literature by exploring the British case up to very recent years through the use of network data 
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and network visualisations, which are a useful iterative tool for uncovering both wider trends 
and pathways for further research. In particular, the article emphasises the importance of 
examining all financial institutions and their activity within the network, rather than focusing 
only on commercial banks.  
Examining complex inter-organisational relationships as represented by board 
interlocks has required the creation of a longitudinal dataset detailing the extent of 
interlocking directorates within the UK’s top 250 companies (fifty financial, 200 non-
financial, based on net assets) for sample years ( 1976, 1983, 1993, 1997, 2000 and 2010). 
The years selected represent distinct phases within British business from the period which 
followed the 1973 secondary banking crisis and multiple policy changes with regard to the 
financial sector and corporations in general (1976 and 1983), the period after the Big Bang 
(1993), the decade of corporate governance code implementation (1997 and 2000) and the 
years following the Global Financial Crisis (2010). The data has been gathered from varied 
sources such as the Stock Exchange Year Book, Times 1000 list, Thompson One, annual 
reports, BoardEx and pre-existing datasets.55 
Using network analysis software (Pajek), we have constructed network graphs for 
each of these benchmark years, aiding the analysis of the changing structure, shape and 
density of the network.56 Measures of network integration, connectivity and dispersion have 
proved useful in a multitude of cases and contexts. Many studies have demonstrated the 
propensity of firms and individuals to form networks in order to gain resources, both tangible 
and intangible.57 The shape of a network and the connections forged and broken occur often 
as a response to changes in the environment. Indeed, examining the network of interlocking 
directorates over decades provides an excellent tool with which to view many of the broader 
changes that occurred within the British business (and indeed, global business) environment. 
Importantly, through the use of actor centrality measures (known as the Freeman degree), it 
has allowed us to gauge which firms occupied the core and periphery of the network in each 
sample year. Discovering actor centrality through the Freeman degree, which is the sum of 
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the shortest paths from a singular node, allows the ranking of firms according to their 
connectedness, the outcome of which reveals how the composition of the core of the network 
changed over time.58 For example, Table 1 demonstrates the changing presence of financial 
institutions (banks, insurance companies and other financials) and the dramatic withdrawal of 
such institutions since the 1980s. The value of the Freeman degree across the benchmark 
years also provides insights into the relative density of the network for each year, thereby 
determining the level of integration within the network.59 
Table 1. Financial Institutions in the top 25 most central companies. 
 
Source: corporate networks dataset. 
 
Other measures, such as firm marginality, isolation and ‘betweenness centrality’ have 
also been examined in each of the network years. This has provided an indication of the 
relative distance between firms in the network, the number of firms which held significant 
intermediary positions and the types of firms which occupied the periphery of the network. 
Crucially, for each year we have also isolated the links between financial institutions (all 
types) and the rest of the network. This data provides insights into the frequency of intra-
sectoral and inter-sectoral links which could indicate an owner-investee company or 
1976 1983 1993 1997 2000 2010
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Insurance Companies 5 4 1 2 1 2
Other Financial Institutions 3 3 1 0 0 1
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advisor/advisee relationships, the presence of financial syndicates or cartel-like behaviour, 
inter-sectoral alliances and, importantly, how intra- and inter-sectoral relationships shifted 
over time in response to the changing nature of business in general.  Although the analysis of 
the corporate network enables us to determine the connectedness of particular firms and the 
overall structure of the directorate network, used in connection with ownership data (see 
Figure 1) we can draw important correlations between degree of ownership and firm 
centrality for a given year. This provides crucial insights into shareholder-board interlocks, 
allowing us to formulate conclusions regarding the level of engagement between the two as 
patterns of ownership shifted over this period.  We can also draw conclusions regarding the 
impact of overseas investment activity, impact of policy implementation such as the Cadbury 
Report and network responses to crises, all of which add to our understanding of the various 
transformations undertaken by the wider British business community in the last half century. 
The following discussion illustrates some of the major changes experienced by the corporate 
network over the benchmark years in conjunction with more general changes in the British 
business landscape. 
The Corporate Network, 1976-2010 
 
The dataset of inter-locking directorships reveals much about changing corporate 
connectivity in British business over the period 1976-2010. Our previous article highlighted a 
number of significant shifts in the pattern of inter-organisational relationships to 1976 visible 
through an analysis of the corporate network. The corporate network of both pre and post-war 
years (1938 and 1958) demonstrated a highly centralised and embedded network. Especially 
in 1958, a denser core of the network dominated by financial institutions had emerged, and 
while these institutions remained well-connected at the centre of  the network, the percentage 
of isolated or marginal firms was high (55%).60 The cartel-like financial clustering evident in 
the corporate network of 1958 illustrates the inward-looking business environment influenced 
by a domestic turn in business during this period.61 Driving much of this behaviour in the 
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period leading up to 1976 were the restrictive lending practices put in place by the 
government and carried out through the Bank of England.62  In the following decades, this 
environment was in perpetual flux, influenced by financial crises, policy changes and 
changing patterns of ownership, all which contributed to the rise of new financial players as 
advisors and intermediaries. In the 1960s and 1970s, as direct private investment declined and 
individuals began to invest their personal wealth through financial intermediaries, 
institutional investors became “the protector of the private shareholder”, the “supervisor of 
efficient resource allocation”, the “auditor of management efficiency”, and at times, simply 
an investment advisor.63 As companies searched for greater liquidity in the 1960s, the Stock 
Exchange and large financial investors and advisors were consequently of much greater 
importance.64 In this period leading up to the late 1970s, one can also view a shift in the 
practices of traditional financial institutions such as merchant banks, who were expanding 
their role as investment advisors to British industry.65  
Another major influence on the network was the merger wave of the late 1950s and 
1960s which amalgamated a number of core British firms, both financial and non-financial. 
Linked to these changes was a significant shift in ownership of British equities, as outlined in 
Figure 1, with institutional investors increasing their share to 34.2%, the largest being 
insurance companies (12.2%), which at times acted on the behalf of pension funds.66 Most 
notable amongst the changes in investment practices was the decline in private ownership of 
UK equity, fundamentally changing the landscape of British business. Changes in the 
regulatory environment in the late 1960s and the secondary banking crisis of the early 1970s 
signified the need to reassess the role and freedoms of financial institutions in the British 
economy.67 This period led to yet another shift in the British business landscape which 
impacted the shape and connectivity of the corporate network in 1976 (Figure 3). In 1976, the 
network demonstrates growing integration of firms as the overall number of marginal or 
isolated firms declined significantly from previous years.68 In the core of the network (Table 
2), the presence of financial institutions other than commercial banks has increased, 
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suggesting the growing importance of these institutions in British business during this period, 
perhaps as a result of their evolving role as advisors and investors.   
Figure 3. The British corporate network in 1976 
 
Table 2. Top 25 most central companies in 1976 (according to Freeman Degree) 
Company name Freeman Degree 
Lloyds Bank 28 
Midland Bank 21 
British Petroleum 19 
National Westminster Bank 18 
Barclays Bank 18 
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Commercial Union 18 
Finance For Industry  17 
Hill Samuel Group 16 
Delta Metal  16 
Tube Investments 15 
Imperial Chemical Industries 15 
Shell Transport & Trading 14 
Standard Chartered Bank 14 
Rank Organisation 14 
Eagle Star Insurance 14 
Royal Insurance 13 
Guardian Royal Exchange Insurance 13 
P & O Steam Navigation 12 
Lazard Brothers 11 
General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance 11 
Lucas Industries 11 
Dunlop Holdings 11 
British Leyland 10 
Fisons 10 
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Hawker Siddeley Group 10 
 
The change in ownership patterns was widely known by the time of the Wilson 
Commission report, which highlighted the distinct move towards ownership of securities by 
financial institutions such as insurance companies and pension funds. This transfer of 
ownership arose out of a general preference for owning shares through financial institutions 
such as unit and investment trusts, as well as a failure by the City to support private investors 
who had less wealth but were eager to invest in domestic corporations.69 At the same time, 
there is little evidence that the accumulation of equity by institutional investors either exerted 
any influence over merger activity or resulted in the formation of shareholder voting 
coalitions.70 
It is apparent from Figure 1 that institutional investors continued their strategy of 
investing in British business, given that by 1981 they owned over half of all listed UK 
equities (57.6%) and pension funds had overtaken insurance companies as the largest single 
category.71 A complicating factor in this scenario, however, was the 1980 Companies Act, 
which by criminalising insider dealing not only made it especially difficult for fund managers 
to access privileged company information, but also created a legal necessity for each to 
maintain a distant relationship.72 Increased competition in the financial sector during the 
1980s, brought on by de-mutualisation and the extensive incursion of foreign banks, 
facilitated by the liberalisation of financial dealing, incited institutions to focus on new areas. 
Banks, for instance, turned their attention to retail banking and international investments as 
the market for corporate finance became saturated with ‘other financials’ and new financial 
intermediaries.73 
This departure from traditional activities created even greater complexity within the financial 
sector, while it is also apparent from Table 3 that even before the ‘Big Bang’ of 1986 the 
nature of the intercorporate network was changing dramatically, most likely exacerbated by 
19 
 
an intense merger wave. Indeed, one can see from Table 3 that by 1983 the average Freeman 
degree of the firms at the core of the network was much lower than it had been in previous 
years. This indicates that as many firms were decreasing the number of direct board links they 
possessed, the network as a whole was much less dense and the distances between firms was 
increasing, creating the much more dispersed network which can be seen in Figure 4. 
However, while the core of the network was noticeably less dense, the number of firms 
connected to the network increased to 81% (up from 75% in the previous benchmark year). 
This trend is linked to the rising number of marginal firms (with only one or two connections 
to the network) which by 1983 made up 30% of the network overall. While financial firms 
were still at the core of the network and ‘other financials’ continued to increase their role as 
shareowners of non-financial companies, the network was far less concentrated than it had 
been in previous year (see Table 2). Above all, this can be linked to the shifting focus of 
financial institutions which created greater dispersion in inter-sectoral links, which if we 
combine this with evidenced preference for short-term results, suggests that the 
implementation of long-term co-operative relationships between boards and shareholders was 
diminishing. The increased distance between financial and non-financial institutions could 
have been exacerbated by many firms turning their focus towards international investment 
activities, giving rise to the much greater frequency of ‘faceless’ interactions facilitated by the 
use of new technologies.   
Table 3. Top 25 most central companies (based on Freeman degree), 1983 
Company name Freeman Degree 
Lloyds Bank 20 
Barclays Bank 18 
Rio Tinto-Zinc Corporation 14 
Hill Samuel Group 13 
Midland Bank 13 
National Westminster Bank 13 
Sun Alliance & London Insurance 13 
'Shell' Transport & Trading 12 
Royal Insurance 12 
British Petroleum Co. 11 
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Eagle Star Holdings 11 
Blue Circle Industries 10 
Imperial Chemical Industries 10 
Standard Chartered Bank 10 
Chloride Group 9 
London & Scottish Marine Oil 9 
Westland 9 
Allied-Lyons 8 
B. A. T. Industries 8 
Inchcape 8 
John Brown 8 
THORN EMI 8 
Kleinwort, Benson, Lonsdale 8 
Legal & General Group 8 
Beecham Group 7 
 
Figure 4. The British corporate network in 1983 
 
Alongside these trends, intra-sector links involving financial institutions were changing. Non-
monetary financial institutions, while still connected to many of the big banks, were moving 
away from these financial players. For example, Hill Samuel Group and Eagle Star Holdings 
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were connected mainly to industrial companies, apart from a small number of investment 
trusts and insurance companies. Although these financial institutions retained good inter-
sectoral links, with only a small group of firms (with a Freeman degree of less than two) 
favouring ties to other financials (only four retained no ties to the network), it is clear that the 
financial cartel of the 1950s had disappeared.74 Furthermore, the network was more dispersed, 
with ‘other financials’ diversifying their links more extensively in order to protect their 
investments. 
While the growing concentration of ownership by financial institutions had the potential to 
allow for cohesive corporate coalitions and greater shareholder influence over corporate 
behaviour,75 the growing dispersion of the network potentially reflects the increasing 
disconnect between shareholders and boards. Crucially, despite the potential for greater 
communication between shareholders and boards, the expected power shift into the hands of 
investors did not occur. Moreover, the deregulation of the London Stock Exchange in the 
mid-1980s provided foreign financial institutions with much greater access to the City of 
London, providing new cash flows for investment, both domestic and international.76 The 
clearing banks especially shifted the focus of their strategies from domestic to global markets, 
a point substantiated in Table 4, which highlights how the centrality of the clearing banks 
declined by 1993. Figure 5 also illustrates how the trend towards a dispersed network 
continued. Table 4 reveals that while Barclays retained the same degree centrality as in 1983, 
the number of financials at the core of the network was decreasing significantly (see Figure 
5). This continued withdrawal of financial institutions from the network was a manifestation 
of the lengthening investment chain which drew shareholders and board further apart, 
effectively leaving boards in control of their respective companies.  
 
Figure 5. The British corporate network in 1993  
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Table 4.Top 25 most central companies (based on Freeman degree), 1993 
Company name Freeman Degree 
Barclays PLC 18 
Rio Tinto PLC 16 
Legal & General Group PLC 15 
De La Rue PLC 13 
Abbey National PLC 13 
Trafalgar House PLC 12 
Bank of Scotland PLC 12 
BAA Airports, Ltd. 11 
English China Clays PLC 11 
Lucas Varity PLC 11 
Unilever PLC 11 
HSBC Holdings PLC 11 
Standard Chartered PLC 11 
Imperial Chemical Industries PLC 10 
Smithkline Beecham PLC 10 
The BOC group LIMITED 10 
Lloyds Banking Group PLC 10 
AstraZeneca PLC 9 
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Rank Group PLC 9 
3I Group PLC 8 
Alliance Boots PLC 8 
BET PLC 8 
BP PLC 8 
Eurotunnel PLC 8 
Hanson, Ltd. 8 
 
In highlighting these characteristics of the 1990s corporate network, it is clear that the 
business environment was undergoing yet another change, given that by 1992 institutional 
investors owned 60.6% of UK equities, financial institutions had significantly decreased their 
presence at the core of the network and, reflecting the push toward changes in corporate 
governance policy, relations between owners and top managers were becoming even more 
remote.77 It can therefore be hypothesised that the 1980s changes in corporate strategy and 
structure, such as increased divestment in subsidiaries by multidivisional corporations, played 
a role in changing governance arrangements, impacting on both the shape and connectivity of 
the corporate network.78 Regardless of this renewed focus on corporate governance, however, 
the largest owners of industrial concerns continued their detachment from the network, which 
in 1993 contained the greatest number of ‘other financials’ with no ties to other firms. It is 
clear from the network data that while the level of integration versus dispersion was much the 
same as in 1983, when financial institutions’ ties are examined they reveal much greater 
change. The syndicated nature of finance seen in the 1950s-1960s was clearly at an end for 
banks, because by the 1980s they possessed far more links to industrial firms and were often 
only linked to one other financial. While this could suggest a positive inter-sectoral 
relationship, it is clear from past decades that intra-sectoral connections provided much 
needed support and monitoring amongst the financial sector. That said, many boards of 
financial institutions other than banks with connections to fewer than three other boards 
maintained only intra-sectoral ties, a dispersion trend that is illustrated in Figures 5 and 6. 
Figure 6. The British corporate network in 1997  
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Table 5.Top 25 most central companies (based on Freeman degree), 1997  
Company name Freeman Degree 
National Westminster Bank PLC 14 
Marks & Spencer Group PLC 14 
M (2003) PLC 13 
British Airways PLC 13 
HSBC Holdings PLC 13 
Barclays PLC 12 
Standard Chartered PLC 12 
Intercontinental Hotels Group PLC 12 
Bank of Scotland PLC 11 
Diageo PLC 11 
Alliance Boots PLC 11 
Reuters Group PLC 11 
Uniq PLC 11 
Inchcape PLC 11 
Rio Tinto PLC 11 
Rank Group PLC 10 
BP PLC 10 
BT Group PLC 10 
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Tesco PLC 9 
EMI Group, Ltd. 9 
Unilever PLC 9 
RSA Insurance Group PLC 9 
Prudential PLC 9 
Abbey National PLC 9 
Imperial Tobacco Group PLC 9 
 
Influenced by numerous corporate scandals,79 stock market manipulations and the behaviour 
of some directors in large corporations, a series of reports and committees advocated the need 
for a closer relationship between top managers and owners.80 An interesting change in the 
network between 1993 and 1997 reflects an important response towards to these recurrent 
corporate governance issues and policy changes. The most noticeable of these was the 1992 
Cadbury Report, which urged boards to ensure greater accountability to shareholders in order 
to fulfil their fiduciary duty and ensure shareholders could exert control over their investee 
companies.81 The Cadbury Code also sought to define more clearly the roles and 
responsibilities of non-executive directors as monitors of corporate behaviour, as well as the 
general need for a greater presence of such non-executive directors on company boards.82 
Conyon and Mallin found that there had been substantial compliance to the Cadbury Code by 
the late 1990s,83 a trend further illustrated by the reduced density of the UK corporate 
network (see Figure 6). At the same time, the network in 1997 reached a high level of 
integration (significantly higher than in the previous benchmark years), with 90% of all firms 
retaining a tie to the network. While the number of marginal firms still occupied a large 
category (25% of firms), the number of completely isolated firms was dramatically lower, 
highlighting the increased levels of integration, albeit with a much less dense core.  
In terms of the financial sector, bank ties in this year retain much of the same 
composition as in 1993. On the other hand, changes to financial institutions other than banks 
were more pronounced. The impact of changes in policy on the position of ‘other financials’ 
was such that by 1997 the number of these firms with no tie to the network had fallen to just 
three. While the network itself was widening and less concentrated at its core, meaning more 
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companies were linked to the network but fewer companies possessed multiple board 
connections, it is clear that there was a concerted effort amongst many financial institutions to 
re-integrate themselves into the network and increase their ties to non-financial firms. For 
example, Manchester & London Assurance group, which in 1993 had no links to the network, 
by 1997 had five, most of which were non-financials (other than Segro PLC). Schroders, an 
important asset management and advisory firm, also increased its links within the network 
from three to five. Additionally, by 1997 Prudential PLC, whose investment arm, Prudential 
Portfolio Managers Ltd., had been the second largest manager of UK equities in 1991, was 
linked only to industrial concerns. Large fund managers of the 1990s such as M & G group 
and Sun Life, neither of which appeared in the 1993 network, were well integrated by 1997. 
The growth and consolidation of firms such as M & G group was indicative of a move toward 
a re-concentration of ownership. This strongly suggests that the poor corporate behaviour of 
the 1980s and the growing detachment of shareholders from their investee company boards 
had provoked both corporate governance reforms and some decisive movements within the 
network by 1997, even if the former were undertaken largely in the interest of protecting 
shareholders and little mention of changes to boardroom behaviour and general business 
ethics was made.84 
Over the course of the next decade, the financial sector continued to grow more 
complex. Although the network appeared to respond positively to policy shifts in 1997 
through greater integration, by 2000 the network was becoming increasingly dispersed, with a 
greater number of firms wholly disconnected. In this year, nearly half of all firms were either 
marginal or isolated, suggesting in some cases growing distance between boards, perhaps 
exacerbated by growing distance between owners and investee companies. Although the 
concentration of ownership in the hands of British financial institutions decreased from the 
mid-1990s and share-ownership generally became more dispersed amongst both domestic and 
international investors, this era witnessed a burgeoning of financial intermediaries and the 
lengthening of an investment chain that was already attenuated.85 These developments served 
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to weaken even further the link between investors and their portfolio companies.86 Even 
though building on what the Cadbury Code first introduced, the Higgs Review (2003) 
highlighted the growing significance of the non-executive director role in providing the basis 
for a relationship with investors.87  Regardless of this change, however, the corporate network 
trends of the 1990s continued into the 2000s. In particular, it is apparent that the network 
widened over this period (see Figure 7), with on the one hand a significant decrease in the 
number of links between firms, albeit with no return to pre-Cadbury levels in terms of 
disconnection.  
Figure 7. The British corporate network in 2000. 
 
It is first of all apparent from Table 6 (see also Figure 7) that financial institutions in 
the network had moved even further away from the core. A second characteristic of the 
network in 2000 was its compartmentalised nature, with a greater number of clusters 
emerging that were set apart from the larger network, as well as firms connected through a 
chain of singular, rather than multiple, integrated links. This was significant in that companies 
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had fewer lines of communication within the network, thereby reducing both the extent of 
interaction between boards and the level of integration. Indeed, the average distance between 
firms continued to increase; despite more firms being connected, the path from one firm to the 
next was on average longer.88 This reflected the complicated inter-organizational 
relationships emerging in this decade, a scenario precipitated by a combination of new 
governance codes and the increased complexity of the financial sector. By 2000, non-
monetary financial institutions had all but disappeared from the Top 25 most central 
companies (see Table 6), potentially illustrating the continued dispersion of share ownership 
amongst financial institutions, individuals and foreign investors. Beneficial ownership of UK 
equity by institutional investors had fallen to just under 50% by 1998, a trend that continued 
into the twenty-first century.89 The decrease in the average degree centrality of the network 
and the withdrawal of financial institutions from the core of the network meant that for the 
first time in the dataset, three non-financial companies occupied the position of most central 
in the corporate network (see Table 6). While banks continued to be well-connected in the 
network, their centrality had also been reduced significantly by the 2000s, illustrating once 
again a decline in the influence they could have exerted over corporate strategy.  
Table 6.Top 25 most central companies (based on Freeman degree), 2000 
Company name Freeman Degree 
British Airways PLC 15 
Invensys PLC 14 
BT Group PLC 12 
Lloyds Banking Group PLC 12 
Cable & Wireless Communications PLC 11 
Rio Tinto PLC 11 
Rolls-Royce Holdings PLC 11 
ALLIANCE BOOTS PLC 11 
Barclays PLC 11 
Standard Chartered PLC 11 
BP PLC 10 
Glaxosmithkline PLC 9 
REUTERS GROUP PLC 9 
HSBC Holdings PLC 9 
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Bank of Scotland PLC 9 
M (2003) PLC 8 
Marks & Spencer Group PLC 8 
Trinity Mirror PLC 8 
Rank Group PLC 8 
NOVAR PLC 8 
Royal Bank Of Scotland Group PLC 8 
Prudential PLC 8 
Anglo American PLC 7 
Tesco PLC 7 
Compass Group PLC 7 
 
One of the more powerful explanations for these trends was that despite a continued focus on 
corporate governance issues by a succession of committees, introducing stricter governance 
guidelines on corporate connectivity, other factors such as increasing global integration and 
riskier financial activity caused the network to be drawn apart once again.90 As a result of 
these developments, the concentration of ownership declined, suggesting that developments 
in corporate governance policy and the financial landscape in general continued to influence 
the nature of ownership in British business. While institutional investors were requesting 
more information about the companies in which they invested (or planned to invest) in order 
to obviate both their limited exit options and marginal influence over senior management, this 
change in attitude was not related to a desire to influence corporate strategy; rather, the 
motivation was a desire to protect investments and maximise returns.91 Even though financial 
institutions continued to be significant owners of British business, their withdrawal from the 
corporate network serves to corroborate the empirical evidence that shareholders in the 
twenty-first century continued to exert limited influence over their portfolio companies. This 
characteristic was further exacerbated by the enormous influx of foreign investors (“Rest of 
World” in Figure 1) from the 1990s. Crucially, boards remained largely in control of 
decision-making and strategy, while investors continued their arm’s-length approach, 
operating mainly through an array of intermediaries who prioritised short-term returns on 
investments  
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Despite fluctuating dispersion in network connections through the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, the global financial crisis of 2007-08 caused yet another dramatic shift in the 
corporate network. As Figure 8 and Table 7 reveal, by 2010 there had been some re-
integration of the network, in that the network reached the highest percentage of integrated 
firms overall in all benchmark years, along with a low number of marginal firms and an even 
lower number of isolated firms (only 8.1% of all firms). The number of total ties between 
firms also increased, indicating increasing density in the network overall. Although banks 
appear to be continually losing their networked position in this period, the activity of banks 
such as Barclays and Lloyds suggest a move towards greater intra-sectoral links, perhaps 
motivated by a need to protect the banks that remained active after the crisis. On the other 
hand, the position of financials as the most central companies in the network continued to 
decline in the 2000s (see Table 1). For banks especially, the crisis had a detrimental effect on 
their position in the network: while the percentage of UK equity ownership by banks had 
been increasing, reaching an all-time peak of 3.5 % in 2008,92 by 2010 this had fallen to 
2.5%, largely as a result of changes to banks’ investment activities in the wake of the crisis.93 
For example, RBS sold off their stake in Direct Line, and similarly Lloyds sold off part of 
their stake in St. James Place, significantly reducing their investment activity in Britain. The 
position of other financial institutions also changed in this period, as a number of them 
returned to the core of the network. For example, firms such as Segro and RSA insurance 
joined the Top 25 most central companies, while Prudential retained its degree centrality with 
a Freeman degree of 8. This trend can be partially explained by the increased emphasis on 
corporate social responsibility,94 a strategy that was articulated through an increase in 
corporate connectivity, leading to greater corporate monitoring within the network, as well as 
an immediate reaction to crisis similar to that which was seen in 1976. With foreign investors 
accounting for a much-increased proportion of UK equities – “Rest of the World” in Figure 1 
rose from 3.6% in 1981 to 24% in 1997 and 41.2% in 2010 - this displaced much of the share-
ownership by UK financial institutions which by 2010 had fallen to 38.5 % (excluding 
banks).95  
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Figure 8. The British corporate network in 2010 
 
Table 7.Top 25 most central companies (based on Freeman degree), 2010 
Company name Freeman Degree 
National Grid PLC 14 
WM Morrison Supermarkets PLC 11 
Tesco PLC 11 
J Sainsbury PLC 11 
BP PLC 11 
Standard Chartered PLC 11 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC (the) 11 
Experian PLC 10 
Rolls-Royce Holdings PLC 10 
Reckitt Benckiser Group PLC 9 
BAE Systems PLC 9 
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Anglo American PLC 9 
Reed Elsevier PLC 8 
Unite Group PLC (the) 8 
IMI PLC 8 
DS Smith PLC 8 
Halfords Group PLC 8 
Segro PLC 8 
Johnson Matthey PLC 8 
Home Retail Group PLC 8 
Vodafone Group PLC 8 
RSA Insurance Group PLC 8 
Prudential PLC 8 
Intertek Group PLC 7 
Arm Holdings PLC    7 
 
The increased level of foreign investment in British corporations has had an astounding effect 
on corporate connectivity. With the influx of foreign investor companies, most of which were 
institutional investors, interlocks as a method of corporate monitoring within the corporate 
network became even more difficult. Similarly, the increased emphasis on board 
independence originating with the 1992 Cadbury Code was further developed through various 
iterations of the Combined Code of Corporate Governance introduced in 2003. This, together 
with the increased internationalisation of business and more recently the diversity agenda, 
reduced the propensity to build corporate networks through board interlocks. Coupled with a 
standardized reduction in board size from the 1990s, it became even more difficult for British 
financial institutions to influence corporate decision-making through board representation. 
While corporate governance mechanisms and investment practices within British financial 
institutions still needed stricter regulations to monitor investor behaviour, the growing 
complexity of the financial sector and the influx of new financial intermediaries have 
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increased the length of the investor chain, creating acute investor disengagement problems 
that were reflected in the increasing withdrawal of financial institutions from the corporate 
network. Furthermore, the governance codes of the 1990s and 2000s, while making a 
concerted effort to improve shareholder-board relationships, have prioritised the protection of 
shareholders over the implementation of regulations to increase investor control over board 
activity. As we noted earlier, shareholder primacy was even enshrined in Company Law from 
2006, reaffirming the propensity of British firms to pursue this approach. The close-knit 
corporate network of the 1950s, although less monitored than in recent decades, possessed 
open lines of communication between boards, giving investors the opportunity to influence 
company strategy and performance. The decline in intra-sectoral links prevalent in the 
financial sector before the 1990s also indicated an important shift away from the ‘self-
regulatory’ environment which at times provided much needed support, monitoring and 
advice to financial and non-financial institutions. What Scott and Griff described as the 
‘financial control’ of British business in the 1980s was never realised in later decades.96 The 
absence of a shift in power into the hands of institutional investors, despite the concentration 
of ownership by financial institutions into the 1990s, meant that boards and managers were 
left to run companies, while institutions merely waited for returns on their investments. Into 
the twenty-first century, the continued control of boards was further demonstrated through the 
activity and decisions of remuneration committees.97  
The withdrawal of financial institutions from the network and the overall declining 
corporate connectivity in recent decades suggests a number of interesting trends related to the 
degree of communication within and between sectors.98 The dispersed structure of the current 
network of interlocks seen in Figure 7 and the involvement of a greater number of foreign 
owners has significant ramifications for the structure and board-level activity of British firms, 
especially as it pertains to instances in which financial institutions represent shareholder 
interests. However, it is questionable whether this marks either the beginning of re-integration 
of certain types of financial institutions into the core of the network, indicative of the 
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beginnings of a reinstitution of financial control over British boards, or simply a temporary 
reaction to new codes of practice and the aftershocks of a global financial crisis. One might 
note, though, that such were the conclusions of The Kay review (2012) and the Ownership 
Commission (2012) relating to the deep level of disengagement by institutional investors, 
both British and foreign, and their continued preference for high-frequency trading, that little 
would change.  
Conclusions and implications for further research 
 
While our previous article on finance-industry relationships for the earlier part of the 
twentieth century demonstrated shifts in bank amalgamations, connectivity and inter-sectoral 
ties, this extension of the corporate network analysis further articulates continual 
transformations in the British financial sector, and indeed British business landscape, as a 
whole up to 2010. Using an original and comprehensive dataset on the directors of the Top 
250 British companies over the period 1976-2010, it has been possible to generate both 
revised views of the UK’s corporate network and contribute to emergent literatures relating 
to: the evolution of corporate governance in the UK; changes within the British financial 
sector; and developments within finance-industry relationships in the last few decades. This 
article has also provided a fresh perspective on wider trends, elaborating further on the work 
of Scott and Windolf by stretching such methods into the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries.99 In particular, we identify a distinct change in the role of British financial 
institutions in British business in recent decades, suggesting a number of interesting 
conclusions. Firstly, given the increasing role of financial institutions in UK equity ownership 
from 1960, the withdrawal of financial institutions from the network suggests a growing 
disconnect between owners and boards, a feature which can only be fully appreciated through 
visualising the corporate network. Additionally, major changes in the business landscape 
related to policy and crises appear to have resonated in the network itself, demonstrating 
reactive corporate interlocking behaviour amongst the largest businesses in Great Britain.  
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Apart from what recent developments in the corporate network suggest about the 
current state of British inter-corporate relationships, and returning to the three observations 
offered at the start of this article, it is apparent from our research that, firstly, by the 2000s 
British corporate networks were much less dense than they had been up to the 1980s. 
Secondly, this highlights the different stages through which UK corporate networks evolved 
between 1976 and 2010; while up to the 1980s financial institutions were acquiring a 
significant number of corporate board directorships in both financial and non-financial firms, 
thereafter they withdrew from the corporate network. This trend can be explained by a 
combination of extended corporate governance regulations that imposed tighter controls on 
cross-company interaction and reduced board size, alongside the pursuit of global strategies 
that took them away from the previous preference for British shareholdings.  Thirdly, the 
1980s marked a decisive watershed in the relationship between financial and other sectors, 
radically altering the perception of UK corporate networks that had been generated up to that 
decade.  
Above all, this research presents a novel perspective on changing relationships 
between Britain’s largest companies over the last half century, one which confirms what 
Hannah noted was the episodic nature of corporate activity in Britain.100 Through the 
corporate network lens, one can evaluate the effectiveness of policy and varied regulatory 
environments, as well as responses to crucial external shifts in the economy and wider 
corporate strategy. At the same time, it is worth adding that much greater research is required 
at a micro- case-study level in order to comprehend fully the relationship between boards and 
investors, providing a challenge that will result in an improved understanding of the dynamics 
of British business over this period. By building a foundation through which one can identify 
major shifts, industry anomalies and the changing networked position of particular categories 
of firms, this study has highlighted important perspectives that warrant further investigation. 
For instance, the changing position of financials suggests that changes in foreign ownership 
and increasing global financial connectivity has had a direct impact on corporate connectivity 
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in British business. Finally, the move towards reintegration seen in both 1976 and again in 
2010 suggests a wider response to crisis which can only be fully appreciated through 
visualising the corporate network. Further research into the impact of crises on the corporate 
network and interlocking behaviour would reveal much regarding inter-organisational 
relationship strategies. This research can also suggest some interesting hypotheses that could 
be more fully realised through micro-level research, especially as it pertains to the continuing 
disconnect between company boards. While one can accept that shareholder primacy, or 
“financialization” strategies, continue to influence corporate strategy in general, given the 
dispersion of the network in recent decades one could argue that there remains what can be 
termed an ‘ownership paradox’ that allows senior management to dictate policy irrespective 
of company law, corporate governance codes and post-1960 ownership trends. Through the 
corporate governance literature and now the revealed dispersion of financial institutions 
within the corporate network itself, one can find little evidence to support the claim that “New 
Financial Capitalism” had come to dominate British business. Even though shareholder 
primacy continued to hold sway, and was indeed enshrined in Company Law by 2006, those 
which owned the bulk of UK equities failed to engage much in the determination of generic 
corporate strategy, allowing boards of directors to continue to dominate decision-making and 
determine their remuneration packages. Given these crucial debates, it is timely to redress 
corporate interlocks over the past decades and examine these major shifts in British business 
up to the present period. While this study provides significant conclusions about macro-trends 
in corporate connectivity since the 1970s, it also crucially provides direction for future 
research by highlighting potential case studies within a wider context, thereby providing 
intricate detail regarding changes to the British business landscape.  
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